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ORIGINAL JUDGMENTS. The application of our long-arm statute in
Texas, just as in most other states, presents the appellate courts each year
with new problems, or at least new wrinkles of old ones. A case of first im-
pression, where jurisdiction was not based on article 2031(b) but on
article 8.24 (d) of the Insurance Code, restates an important general prin-
ciple applying to all statutes providing for constructive service upon a
state official for nonresidents: "It is well settled that in order to obtain
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, the record must show a strict
compliance with the provided method of service of process."' In this case
service of process had been made on the Texas Insurance Commissioner in-
stead of the Chairman of the Board of Insurance Commissioners. Since the
Insurance Code article 8.24 (d) provides that Mexican casualty companies
can be served either on the agent for receiving process designated by them
or upon the Chairman of the Board of Insurance Commissioners of Texas,
the court correctly held that the default judgment in the district court had
to be reversed.
Another civil appeals case presented the problem of whether a broadcast
of a CBS program over various television stations throughout the state
constitutes doing business. The court stated that committing libel or slan-
der in whole or in part, in Texas, constitutes doing business here under
article 2031 (b) and that "a broadcasting system is doing-business in the
states where its programs are carried."' However, it emphasized twice this
was immaterial to the outcome of the case since the cause of action was
barred by the statute of limitations.4
The only long-arm statute case which develops the full scope of the
constitutional problems raised by its application is Atwood Hatcheries v.
* LL.B., University of Mississippi; LL.M., Yale University; J.U.D., University of Prague. Pro-
fessor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
'Anglo Mexicana de Seguros, S.A. v. Elizondo, 405 S.W.2d 722, 725 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
error ref. n.r.e.
'Harris v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 405 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error
ref. n.r.e.
3Id. at 618. The court cited, as authority, only one case, State ex rel. Columbia Broadcasting
Co. v. Superior Court, 1 Wash. 2d 379, 96 P.2d 248 (1939). While there arc many cases on what
constitutes business within a state by foreign magazine, newspaper, or other publishing corporations,
see Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 747 (1954), only one other case dealing with a national broadcasting sys-
tem, Hoffa v. National Broadcasting Co., 213 F. Supp. 895 (E.D. Mich. 1963) could be found.
4405 S.W.2d at 616 & 618.
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Heisdorf 0 Nelson Farms, decided by the Fifth Circuit, holding that a
foreign corporation was doing business in Texas.' In this case service
of process was not had on the Secretary of State under section 3 but on the
general manager of a Washington corporation while he was attending a na-
tional convention in Texas. Section 2' provides that service upon a foreign
corporation "not required ... to designate or maintain an agent, . . . may
be made by serving a copy of the process with the person who, at the time
of the service, is in charge of any business in which the defendant or de-
fendants are engaged in this State . . . ." It is true that article 203 1,7 which
was not formally repealed by the enactment of article 2031 (b), states that
a foreign corporation may be served with process on the president and
other officers, general managers, local or travelling agent or travelling sales-
s 357 F.2d 847 (Sth Cir. 1966). The issue of the case is described by Judge Brown as follows:
The broad legal question here is whether the Texas Long Arm statute tries to
reach as far as the State of Washington and, concluding that Texas would hardly
grope for less than its reach, whether the Federal Constitution reduces the grasp.
Reduced to the biologico-legal terms of this record, the question in the Hanson-
Denckla concept is whether the corporation has *.. . purposefully [availed] itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the .. .State' when, under the con-
tractual relationship, in addition to a few roving human inspectors, visitors, veteri-
narians, or ambassadors of good will coming to Texas, its regular representatives
are pure bred male chicks under a sort of fowl bare-boat charter-lease whose Texas
mission is to fertilize the eggs of purchased female chicks of like lineage whose progeny
is to carry on the good name of the strain to the mutual advantage of the Vendor-
Lessor and Buyer-Lessee.
Id. at 849.
The footnotes of the opinion give a full list and analysis of all the important cases which have
been decided by the Fifth Circuit and federal district courts in Texas as well as all the leading.
United States Supreme Court cases. The fact that so many more significant cases have been decided
by the Fifth Circuit than by the Supreme Court of Texas should not let us forget that the state
courts' concept of "doing business" must be followed by the federal courts in diversity of citizenship
cases and that FED. R. Crv. P. -4 () provdes'in its second sentence "fer service on nonresidents -in
the manner prescribed in a statute or rule of court of the state in which the court is held. It would
be regrettable if the federal courts in Texas, for the lack of state precedents, might create the im-
pression that they are not bound by the state law in the application of long-arm statutes.
The recent limitation imposed upon Erie R.R. v. Tompkins in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965) with regard to service of process in federal courts applies only to rule 4(d) (1) and not
to rule 4(e).
With the exception of the Fourth Circuit, which is less explicit on this point, all the other
courts of appeals have expressed the view that the amenability of foreign corporations to suit in
federal courts is determined by state law. Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 1103, 1109-29 (1966). Jaftex Corp.
v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d s08 (2d Cir. 1960) holding that the amenability to suit should
be determined in accordance with federal law has been overruled in Arrowsmith v. United Press
Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963). For further discussion see VanDercreek, Texas Civil Procedure,
this Survey at footnote 18.
eTEx. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 2 (1964).
When any foreign corportion, ... though not required by any Statute of this State
to designate or maintain an agent, shall engage in business in this State, in any action
in which such corporation, ... is a party or is to be made a party arising out of such
business, service may. be made by serving a copy of the process with the person who,
at the time of the service, is in charge of any business in which the defendant or de-
fendants are engaged in this State, provided a copy of such process, together with
notice of such service upon such person in charge of such business shall forthwith
be sent to the defendant or to the defendant's principal place of business by registered
mail, return receipt requested.
?TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031 (1964).
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men. The Atwood opinion, however, does not mention article 2031 as the
basis of service of process, and it seems doubtful that a general manager
coming to a convention in Texas unconnected with the specific business
transactions in the state qualifies as a proper person upon whom service
may be made under section 2 of article 2031 (b). No Texas case interpret-
ing this latter section could be found. The opinion concentrates on section
4-the question of doing business-and on the purpose of the long-arm
statute, reaching the conclusion that "(the Texas purpose [in enacting
article 2031 (b)] was to exploit to the maximum the fullest permissible
reach under federal constitutional restraints.)"" It can of course be argued
that this principle also applies to the service-of-process provision and not
just to the concept of doing business. It is submitted, however, that section
4 does not deal with service of process, and section 2 seems to apply to the
local agent only. It is unfortunate that the opinion does not deal with this
novel point of statutory construction, particularly because a Texas civil
appeals court decision reaffirmed in the current period the principle that
there must be strict compliance with the constructive service of process for
nonresidents.! In another case, Turner v. Jack Tar Grand Bahama, Ltd.,'
the Fifth Circuit held that the alleged contracts of the foreign corporation
were insufficient in view of the due process clause to permit Texas courts to
take jurisdiction. Having decided the constitutional question, the court
refrained from construing article 2031(b) before the Texas courts had a
chance to do so because there was no need to reach it. The question of jur-
isdiction over the person under long-arm statutes also arose when money
judgments rendered in other states were sued upon in Texas courts. These
cases are discussed in. the second part dealing with full faith and credit to
sister-state judgments.
Lack of jurisdiction over the person was unsuccessfully claimed when the
defendant alleged that she had been fraudulently induced to enter the state
solely for the purpose of being served with process." A question of divorce
jurisdiction arose in a case based upon article 4631, as amended in 1957,
allowing members of the armed forces stationed in Texas to file a divorce.
The district court dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff was not a
bona fide resident of Potter County, Texas, although he had been stationed
Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847, 8 52 (5th Cir. 1966). (Quot-
ing from Thode, In Prsonam Jurisdiction; Article 2031b, The Texas "Long Arm" Jurisdiction
Statute; and the Appearance To Challenge jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEXAS L. REv.
279, 307 (1964).)
'Anglo Mcxicana de Seguros, S.A. v. Elizondo, 405 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error
ref. n.'r.e. A recent example for the reluctance of a federal court of appeals to interpret a state
long-arm statute can be found in Judge Medina's concurring opinion in Buckley v. New York
Post'Corp., No. 30757, 2d Cit., Jan. 10, 1967.
10353 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1965).
" Cornell v. Cornell, 402 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted.
1967]
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there for more than two years. The court of civil appeals,1' applying the
leading case Wood v. Wood," reversed. While several pre-1957 decisions in-
sist on a bona fide domicile, the very purpose.of the .1957 amendment of
article 4361 was to create a fiction of domicile and to dispense with the
prerequisite of domicile for divorce actions brought by military personnel
stationed in Texas. Another case, where the vendor had sued an out-of-state
purchaser and his local escrow agent without attachment of the purchase
money by the court, reaffirmed the elementary principle that no personal
obligation can be sued upon without personal service or attachment of a
res in the court's jurisdiction."'
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO SISTER-STATE JUDGEMENTS. Many more
cases concerning jurisdiction over the person (or the thing) arose when
full faith and credit to sister-state judgments was sought.
Money Judgments. O'Brien v. Lanpar Co.' involved an action upon a
default judgment obtained pursuant to the Illinois long-arm statute against
a Texas corporation."' The Supreme Court of Texas recognized that the
Illinois judgment satisfied the due process requirements. It emphasized that
the president of the Texas corporation "purposefully went [to Illinois] to
make contractual arrangements" for an attorney and that this "contact
was substantial rather than casual and fortuitous," even though the de-
fendant had apparently made only one contract there."7 It seems regret-
table that the opinion emphasized the discrepancy between the concept of
"doing any business" used in the Illinois long-arm statute and that of
"transacting business" used in article 8.01 of the Texas Business Corpora-
tion Act. Article 8.01 does not deal with the question of obtaining judicial
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation but with an entirely different situa-
tion, namely under what circumstances a foreign corporation is required
to procure a certificate of authority from the Secretary of State to transact
business here. If any comparison of the Illinois statute with a Texas statute
were to be made it should have been with articles 2031 (b), section 4"
or 2031."
A civil appeals case involved an action based upon a default judgment
obtained against a Texan in Oklahoma."0 Service of process had been ob-
tained in accordance with the Oklahoma nonresident service-of-process
statute, ' and the defendant was served in Texas by the local sheriff. The
"Miller v. Miller, 403 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
13 159 Tex. 350, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959), 13 Sw. L.J. 233, 37 TEXAS L. REV. 626.
14Henry v. Reno, 401 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
"399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966).
110 ILL. STAT. ANN. §5 16, 17 (1956) (Civil Practice Act).
"7O'Brien v. Lanpar, 399 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Tex. 1966).
"TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 4 (1964).
"TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031 (1964).
2"Roberts v. Hodges, 401 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
"1 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 187 (1963).
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Texas district court rendered judgment for the creditor, although the de-
fendant-appellant claimed lack of jursidiction of the Oklahoma court in
rendering a judgment. On appeal, it was held that in order to come within
the fullfaith and credit clause-a judgment must be a "final, valid, subsist-
ing judgment not vacated or set aside in the state of rendition; and . . .
conclusive on the merits,"'* and valid on its face. The introduction of an
authenticated copy made a prima facie case, and the defendant had the
burden to establish that the judgment was not valid or that the court had
no jurisdiction. The attack against the Oklahoma statute as being unconsti-
tutional for violating the due process clause was unsuccessful. The court
found that the minimum contact test was satisfied because the promissory
note originally sued upon in Oklahoma was executed and made payable in
that state. In a similar decision' the plaintiff had obtained a New York
judgment for the amount of a bill for dental services performed in New
York at a time when the defendant was a resident of New Jersey. The
plaintiff sued on the judgment in Texas and was granted a summary judg-
ment. The court of civil appeals held that the defendant-appellant had the
required minimum contact with New York and affirmed.
In another case involving the enforcement of a sister-state judgment, the
defendant-appellant unsuccessfully raised the novel point that two old
Texas Supreme Court cases" -allegedly require certification of a sister-state
judgment by the chief justice or presiding magistrate. The court pointed
out that the federal statute implementing the full faith and credit clause
requires only the certificate of a "judge of the court."
Foreign Custody Decrees. The Texas Supreme Court, in Bukovich v.
...Bukovich,". reemphasized that..owourts will .give full faith and credit to
custody decrees of sister states and will not order a change of custody in
the absence of proof of a subsequent material change of conditions. The
case is an appropriate reminder of the correct treatment of foreign custody
decrees. All too often courts seem to forget that "at the time it is entered,
a custody judgment is res judicata of the question of the best interest of
the child,""7 and that they are not free to make a new determination of the
best interest of the child unless a subsequent material change of conditions
can be proven. In the case at hand the Supreme Court found that the evi-
dence did not support the lower court's finding of a material change of con-
ditions since the time that the original sister-state decree was rendered.
" Roberts v. Hodges, 401 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
'
1Nyman v. Schnitzer, 405 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error dismissed.
'Paschall v. Geib, 405 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), citing Harper v. Nichol, 13 Tex.
151 (1854) and Randall v. Burtis, 57 Tex. 362 (1882). Only the second case holds what the at-
tacker claims it does.
2s28 U.S.C. S 1738 (1964).
2 399 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. 1966).
*1Id. at 529.
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Upon hearing, Judge Smith, in a concurring opinion, stated that even
though there was substantial evidence showing changed circumstances, the
findings of such changed conditions did not warrant holding, in, this case
that a change of custody was' in the best interest of the child. It is important
to remember that not every change of conditions gives courts the right to
make a readjudication of custody.
The problems of full faith and credit to custody decrees and the juris-
dictional basis for such decrees were dealt with in a civil appeals case.2 The
husband and wife were originally residents of Arkansas, where they had
had three children. When they separated, the husband took two children to
Texas and established a domicile there. The wife then secured a divorce
decree in Arkansas which granted her custody of all three children, includ-
ing the two living with their father. The husband was served by publica-
tion and was represented in the proceedings only by a court-appointed at-
torney. In order to obtain the physical custody of the children, the mother
brought a habeas corpus proceeding in Texas and presented a certified copy
of the Arkansas decree. The district court rendered judgment for the mo-
ther, holding that the custody provisions of the Arkansas decree were
entitled to full faith and credit. The court of civil appeals correctly re-
versed, holding the custody decree void. It is unfortunate, though, that the
court based its decision on, and quoted extensively from, Henthorne v.
Tyler," a court of civil appeals decision rendered only about four months
after the rendition of the controlling United States Supreme Court case,
May v. Anderson, which was at that time apparently still unknown to at-
torneys and court. The Flenthorne case and the quotation therefrom in the
case before us, although mentioning the lack of -personal service or--appear-
ance, place primary emphasis upon the domicil of a child as the basis for a
valid custody decree. A second case cited by the court for denying full
faith and credit, decided in 1959, does not even mention the lack of juris-
diction over the defendant parent but bases its decision on the theory that
a court has no jurisdiction to render a custody decree "when the physical
being of the child is in another state than that in which the divorce suit
is pending."'1 It seems to be high time that, in dealing with full faith
and credit to custody decrees, our courts acknowledge the due process lim-
itations on such decrees and base their decisions on the pertinent United
States Supreme Court decision May v. Anderson"" holding that a custody
decree rendered without personal jurisdiction over the parent was not en-
titled to full faith and credit.
" Fletcher v. Fletcher, 404 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
2'266 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
30 345 U.S. 528 (1953), 67 HARv. L. REv. 121 and many others but not in one appearing
in Texas.
"x Best v. Best, 331 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
"May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), 67 HAv. L. REv. 121.
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To our knowledge May v. Anderson has been cited only once by a Texas
appellate court in a case when it was not quite in point' before the United
States Supreme Court reversed the Texas Supreme Court in Armstrong v.
Manzo,' holding that lack of notice to the natural father of a child in a
Texas adoption proceeding violated the due process clause. Since then May
v. Anderson has been cited in the civil appeals decision conforming with the
United States Supreme Court mandate in the Armstrong case and in an-
other adoption case." It is well known that courts base their jurisdiction to
adjudicate custody of children on several theories."6 But no matter what
theory the court may use, the judgment must comply with the constitu-
tional due process provision which protects a parent from being deprived of
the custody of his child when the court does not have in personam juris-
diction over such parent."'
Support Judgments. Full faith and credit to a sister-state child-support
decree did not help the plaintiff in a proceeding based upon the pre-1965
Enforcement of Support Act."s A divorced wife brought the proceeding to
aDowden v. Fischer, 338 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960). The court states that in
May v. Anderson "it was held unnecessary to accord full faith and credit to modification orders
where the court's jurisdiction in the original divorce action rested on other than personal service
or appearance." May v. Anderson did not involve full faith and credit to a modification decree.
34 3 80 U.S. 545 (1965), 19 Sw. L.J. 413 (1965) and 64 MicH. L. REv. 726 (1966).
'In re Armstrong's Adoption, 394 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965); Whitehead v.
Lout, 395 S.W.2d 68, 74 (1965), 18 BAYLOR L. REv. 4 (1966).
' See, e.g., Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739, 748 (1948).
Several theories have been advanced with respect to the correct basis for jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter of a child custody proceeding. According to one theory
jurisdiction over children's custody is based on in personam jurisdiction over the
children's parents . . . . Another theory regards the question of custody as simply one
of status and as such subject to the control of the courts of the state where the child
is domiciled. . . . A third theory requires the child to be physically present within the-
""iate, on the ground that the basic problem before the court is- to determine-what
the best interest of the child is, and the court most qualified to do so is the one
having access to the child.
This case did not:involve full faith and credit to a sister-state judgment.
"
t Vogel v. Vogel, 405 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). This is a case illustrative of the
fact of how little our courts concern themselves with the jurisdictional bases for a custody adjudica-
tion and the constitutional limitations. A divorced woman brought a bill of review to set aside a
judgment awarding custody to the father. She claimed that the personnel of the court had mis-
placed her answer to a complaint filed by the father which alleged changed circumstances and
prayed that custody of the children be awarded to him. After the time for a motion for a new
trial had expired the father took the children. The mother then filed an application for a bill of
review which was granted and the court of civil appeals affirmed. The opinion -expressly states that
the petition makes no reference to the whereabouts of the appellant who was served personally in
Ohio. An affidavit alleged that at the time when the petition of the bill of review was filed, father
and children were residents of Maryland. At the time when the petition for bill of review was
filed the children were neither physically present in Texas nor were they domiciled there. The
court had no personal jurisdiction over the defendant and there is no indication that the divorce
was adjudicated in Texas with jurisdiction over the father in which case the judgment could be
upheld on the theory of continued jurisdiction. The opinion does not even state where the divorce
judgment was rendered. It merely mentions that the parties had been involved in several suits in
Texas, California and Maryland, involving the custody of the children. It would be interesting to
know what effect such a judgment would be given in Maryland or any other state where the wife
would try to enforce it.
"eClapp v. Clapp, 393 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) applying former arts. 2328b-1,
2328b-2, 2528b-3, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., all repealed in 1965.
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recover unpaid child support payments due under an Alabama judgment
(and, in the alternative, sought judgment against the defendant for the
amount of delinquent child support payments). The trial court held that
the plaintiff had not proved the amount claimed to be due under the Ala-
bama decree and dismissed the suit on the merits. The court of civil ap-
peals emphasized that the right to past-due installments under the support
decree was absolute and vested."' The court nevertheless affirmed the judg-
ment of the district court because the plaintiff had not pleaded and proven
that the foreign judgment had become final. ' The interpretation of the
pre-1965 Enforcement of Support Act, on which the alternative prayer
was based will be discussed in the second part of this survey.
The new act in its sections 32 to 37 provides for registration of foreign
support orders in Texas courts. Support orders are defined in section 2(j)
as "any judgment, decree or order of support whether temporary or final,
whether subject to modification, revocation or remission regardless of the
kind of action in which it is entered." This provision eliminates the need
for bringing a new action in a Texas court and represents the first possi-
bility to resort to a simplified method of registration of sister-state judg-
ments similar to that which has been adopted by eight states in the Uni-
form Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act for judgments entitled to full
faith and credit."1 Section 34 indicates that the procedure upon the petition
for registration is governed by the same principles as that in an action on
a foreign judgment.
Land Decrees. Full faith and credit was refused to an Arkansas judg-
ment in a proceeding brought by a man against his former wife to partition
a tract of land.' They had livedin Texarkana- when-theyacquired-,the land
in question. A short time thereafter the plaintiff-husband went to Arkansas
for the express purpose of getting a divorce which he obtained upon cita-
tion by publication. On the same day that the husband obtained his divorce
the wife instituted a suit for divorce and division of the community prop-
erty in the 102d Judicial District in Texas. The husband was served by
publication, and she obtained the divorce and was awarded the tract of land
as her separate property. Later, in 1934, the husband filed.a suit in the Fifth
seRumpf v. Rumpf, 150 Tex. 475, 242 S.W.2d 416 (1951). The case gives full faith and
credit to an Idaho decree for accrued alimony installments.4 Clapp v. Clapp, 393 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex. Civ. App, 1965) stated that the trial court had
not erred to grant judgments for "some speculative matured sum as being vested in the plaintiff."
41 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 474 (1965).
'TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2328b-4, 5 36 (Supp. 1966):
The procedure to obtain jurisdiction of the person or property of the obligor shall
be as provided in civil cases. The obligor may assert any defense available to a de-
fendant in an action on a foreign judgment, If the obligor defaults, the court shall
enter an order confirming the registered support order and determining the amounts
remaining unpaid. If the obligor appears and a hearing is held, the court shall ad-
judicate the issues including the amounts remaining unpaid.
4' Holder v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.
[Vol. 21
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Judicial District in Texas to set aside the wife's divorce judgment and the
partition of the community which succeeded. It is not clear on what basis
the plaintiff in the present action claimed that the Arkansas divorce decree
must be given full faith and credit. In claiming title to land in Texas, an
Arkansas divorce decree could not have had any effect on the adjudication
of property interests. Nevertheless, the opinion states that the Arkansas
judgment "was acquired through a fraud that was perpetrated upon the
court,' - that the plaintiff did not plead the Arkansas judgment nor res
adjudicata or estoppel (apparently in the previous divorce and partition
proceeding brought by the wife) and that, in the absence of pleading and
proof of the laws of a sister state, the laws of that state would be pre-
sumed to be the same as those of Texas. Although the court correctly de-
clared the Arkansas judgment void, it is difficult to understand why it did
not dispose of the full-faith-and-credit argument by simply stating that
the judgment of a court, not having jurisdiction over the Texas land, could
not possibly have had any effect on the title question in issue. Instead, the
court held that plaintiff's judgment obtained in his action in 1934 to set
aside the divorce and partition was a nullity because such an attack could
have been made only in the court which had rendered the divorce and the
partition judgment and that the judgment obtained by the wife had be-
come final.
A Colorado judgment adjudicating land located there posed another
problem of full faith and credit in a Texas divorce proceeding. Before the
husband brought his divorce action here, the wife had filed a separate
maintenance suit in Colorado where the parties owned community and
--separate -property. The Texas courtgranted the husband the divorce and,
ignor-_g the prior Colorado judgment adjudicating the Colorado property
as to that of the, wife as her separate property, took the Colorado property
into account in dividing the community. The wife appealed, claiming that
this judgment denied full faith and credit to the Colorado judgment. The
husband's contention that the Colorado court had had no jurisdiction cor-
rectly was found to be without merit and the court of civil appeals re-
versed, holding that the Colorado judgment was entitled to full faith and
credit.'
Mexican Divorce Decree. In another divorce case involving the partition
of Texas community property the court held invalid a Mexican divorce
where the husband had surreptitiously gone to Mexico and prosecuted the
divorce suit without notice to the wife."
judgment Based on Arbitration Awards. A New York judgment ren-
44 Id. at 909.
"'Frazier v. Frazier, 394 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error dismissed.
" Risch v. Risch, 395 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error dismissed. For validity of Mexi-
1967]
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dered in confirmation of two awards made by a board of arbitration was
held entitled to full faith and credit despite the claim of the losing parties
that they had not been personally served within the limits of the state of
New York. The court took judicial notice of New York statutes and case
law providing that an agreement to arbitrate also constitutes consent to be
sued in the courts of that state. It held that service of process on the de-
fendants' attorney and his appearance in court were sufficient and affirmed
the summary judgment of the district court for the plaintiff."'
II. CHOICE-OF-LAW
The only case which presented the Supreme Court of Texas with a novel
problem and a chance to establish whether Texas would follow the tradi-
tional lex loci delicti doctrine or break with this rule in the field of tort
liability and inter-spousal immunity had to be declared moot since the
parties filed a motion to dismiss the writ of error which had already been
granted. By declaring the case moot, the supreme court also vacated the
decision of the court of civil appeals."s The husband and wife, residents of
Dallas, were involved in an automobile collision in Oklahoma, and the wife
sued her husband, the driver of the car, in Oklahoma to recover damages
for personal injuries. While Texas law does not allow the wife to recover
damages from her husband, Oklahoma law permits such actions. Prior to
the rendition of an Oklahoma judgment, the husband's insurance company
filed suit in Texas for a declaratory judgment against the couple to deter-
mine that the company was not obligated to pay for such accident. The dis-
trict court held for the insurance company, and _upon appeal, the issue
.
presented was, "What 'law governs as to tle right of the wife to maintain
an action for personal injuries against her husband?"' It is unfortunate
that the Texas Supreme Court was not offered a chance to rule on this
point;'" the law in some sister states is in a state of flux 1 and this is a ques-
tion yet to be answered in Texas.
The other cases dealing with choice-of-law are more routine. In an
action by a Michigan bank on a promissory note the defendant filed a
can divorces in which both parties were before the court, see Note, 20 Sw. L.J. 174 (1966).
'Brownwood Mfg. Co. v. Tanenbaum Textile Co., 404 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
error ref. n.r.e.
" United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Lederle, 400 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1966) vacating Lederle v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 394 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
4Id. at 3 3.
"The court based its decision upon the tentative draft of the Second Restatement of Conflict
of Laws, an annotation in 22 A.L.R.2d 1248 (1952), and three law review articles. Comment,
18 BAYLOR L. REV. 477 (1966) started its discussion of the case with the words that the court
of civil appeals had handed the supreme court "a veritable golden egg of opportunity to write on
an unsettled point of law."
"Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205 (N.H. 1966) gives an excellent description of most recent
developments in this field.
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cross-claim on the payment of usurious interest. The contract being exe-
cuted and to be performed in Michigan, and the parties being Michigan
citizens at that time, the court applied the well-established rule that the
validity of the contract was to be determined by the law of that state."
In a case concerning land in Texas left to testator's wife another well-
established rule applied. "[A]s to land situated in Texas the laws of this
state will control the nature of the property rights acquired by non-residentpersons.""
The Texas Supreme Court clarified the application of the 1951 Uni-
form Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) in Bjorgo v.
Bjorgo." Since an amended act has become effective in August 1965, some
problems which have plagued our courts in the past should not occur again.
The court of civil appeals decision in Bjorgo v. Bjorgo," based on California
v. Copus,5' has demonstrated that the 1951 act, meant to provide speedy
and efficient relief for dependents, did not achieve this purpose and needed
amendment." It is hoped that the URESA now in force will avoid the
major problems created by the application of the 1951 act. Formerly, the
obligee was given an election to demand support -according to the
law where either the obligor or obligee was present when the failure to sup-
port commenced" and had not provided for a special simplified procedure
for registration of foreign support orders [judgments] as adopted by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1958. The new act will relieve
support-seeking dependents from having to bring a new action in Texas
in judgment situations like the Clapp case; when there is no sister-state
judgment involved, the new act will usually relieve the obligee from plead-
ing and proving the law of a sister-state.'
A potential choice-of-law problem arose in a case involving a partner-
ship of two Texas women in a Mexican lottery ticket. One partner claimed
a one-half interest in a winning ticket, and the other alleged that such
ticket belonged to her son and not to the partnership. The court of civil
5
"Doppke v. American Bank & Trust Co., 402 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref.
n.r.e.
"Ing. v. Cannon, 398 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.
54402 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. 1966), 20 Sw. L.J. 422.
55 Bjorgo v. Bjorgo, 391 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), noted in great detail in 19 Sw.
L.J. 801 and 42 N.D. L. REV. 57.
so158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W.2d 227 (1958), 57 MICH. L. REV. 116 (1958), 12 Sw. L.J. 508
(1958), 37 TEXAs L. REV. 773 (1959), 6 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 145 (1959).
17 One recent case, reported during the period surveyed here, Benson v. Benson, 400 S.W.2d 340
(Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e., was appealed twice, the first appeal reported in 368 S.W.2d
125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) error ref. n.r.e. The mother had filed her original petition for support
for the child on July 7, 1961, in California. It apparently took five years before the right to
child support was established.
"' TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338b-3, § 7 (1964). It was this section which created
the difficulties in the Copus case, supra note 56, and the first Bjorgo case, 391 S.W.2d 528 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1965), 19 Sw. L.J. 801.
aSCl app v. Clapp, 393 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), 19 Sw. L.J. 801.
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appeals stated that the contract, even though lawful in .Mexico, was illegal,
against public policy, and unenforceable. But it found that the illegality
of the original contract between the two women did not affect plaintiff's
right against the son who had converted the money to his own use and
benefit, and therefore he could not interpose the plea of illegality. The
plaintiff had based her cause of action not on the illegal agreement but on
her ownership of an interest in the ticket. The defendant was, there-
fore,_ considered to hold the money as an agent, trustee, or bailee implied
in law."0 The Texas Supreme Court granted error in this and a related case"
and has heard oral arguments. 2 The court of civil appeals' approach to the
case seems sounder than that of many other courts deciding similar cases
by characterizing them as actions based on the original contract and ap-
plying the public policy doctrine."3 The court found that "the wagering
contract had been executed, and the fruits thereof had been paid to one
who, . . . was not authorized to keep them.... The illegality of the orig-
inal transaction between the parties thereto does not taint or vitiate the
rights of the principals to sue a third party recipient of the fruits of the
illegal transaction.""
III. FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS
Apart from the more or less routine applications of Erie R.R. v. Tomp-
kins and its progeny in the federal courts in Texas, the application of the
abstention doctrine by the Fifth Circuit-referring the parties to the Texas
courts for determination of the applicable state law'-and subsequent
state court action gave rise to some noteworthy decisions in this field which
should have far-reaching effect.
There are several cases in which the Fifth Circuit followed Erie by ap-
plying the Texas precedents."' However, there is also one in which the
6 5Castilleja v. Camero, 402 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), aff'd, 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 340
(1967).
61 Castilleja v. Camero, 402 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), aff'd, 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 346
(1967). While the appeal was pending plaintiff brought another action for a writ of mandamus to
compel the constructive trustee to deposit the funds belonging to her as co-owner of the ticket with
the court clerk pending the disposition of the appeal in the first case. The district judge granted the
writ and the court of appeals affirmed. Even though the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
Mexican bank where the funds were deposited, it had jurisdiction over the person of the con-
structive trustee.
62 10 TEx. SuP. CT. J. 2 (1966).
""See, e.g., Ciampittiello v. Campitello, 134 Conn. 51, 54 A.2d 669 (1947) noted critically
in 27 NEB. L. REV. 440 (1948) and 9 U. PITT. L. REV. 125 (1947).
"Castilleja v. Camero, 402 S.W.2d 265, 269-70 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). The court based
its decision on several Texas precedents directly in point. The oldest authority is Floyd v. Patterson,
72 Tex. 202, 10 S.W. 526 (1888).
" It should be noted that, as Professor Wright has pointed out, there are in effect four
sometimes overlapping abstention doctrines. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 169 (1963). We are con-
cerned here with that applied by federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases "to leave to the
states the resolution of unsettled questions of state law." Ibid.
6"Se6, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Martin, 362 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1966) (proximate cause);
Green v. Aetna Ins. Co., 349 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1965) (obligation of liability insurer).
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court, for lack of Texas precedents in point, had to make an educated guess
what the Texas law might be. In an action to collect past due rent from a
bonding company which had guaranteed rent payments under a ten-year
lease, the defendant claimed that the lease had been terminated because the
lessor had employed brokers to find a possible purchaser or lessee for the
property. The court stated that no Texas case has held that a lease was ter-
minated by operation of law where the landlord had merely indicated an in-
tent to consider selling or reletting. The Fifth Circuit opinion states,
"[W]e think Texas requires an actual reletting before a surrender [of the
lease] by operation of law can.take place."67 The scarcity or complete lack
of state precedents may sometimes create the impression that the federal
courts do not consider themselves bound by state law."' On the other hand
we find cases in which the Fifth Circuit is very careful in expressing its in-
tention not to encroach upon the state courts' prerogative to construe Texas
statutes."9
A significant problem of federal-state relations was raised in two of three
insurance cases brought in the federal courts concerning the insurance cov-
erage of airplane pilots. In these cases the Fifth Circuit abstained, stayed
the proceedings and, while retaining jurisdiction, directed the appellants to
seek promptly a declaratory judgment in the Texas state courts with a
review by a state court of last resort. As the majority put it in the first
case, United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney"' decided en banc, with four
judges dissenting: "The guidance of the dim light of the Texas decisions
leaves meaning of the questioned clauses obscure,"' although in a prior
case a panel of the Fifth Circuit had held a 1953 Texas Supreme Court
case,- Continental Cas. Co. v. Warren7 2. to -be controlling." The dissenters-
did not feel that this was a case for the application of the abstention doc-
trine and pointed out that, unlike Florida, Texas had made no provision for
certification of doubtful questions of the state law by the federal courts74
0 alSouth Falls Corp. v. Kalkstein, 349 F.2d 378, 385 (5th Cir. 1965). For further discussion
see Larson, Property, this Survey at footnote 3.
"a See, e.g., the discussion of Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847
(5th Cir. 1966). See text accompanying note 5 suPra.
"'See Turner v. Jack Tar Grand Bahama, Ltd., 355 F.2d 954, 956 (5th Cir. 1965) discussed
in text accompanying note 10 supra.
70328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964). For further discussion see
VanDercreek, Texas Civil Procedure, this Survey at footnote 111.7
1 Id. at 484.7
1Continental Cas. Co. v. Warren, 152 Tex. 164, 254 S.W.2d 762 (1953).
71 United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 308 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1962).
'United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 485 (5th Cir.) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964). Judge Brown in a concurring opinion expressed his confidence
in the Texas state judicial system and defends the application of the abstention doctrine as follows:
It is judicial statesmanship of the highest and proper order for us to conclude that
these questions, so very vital and important to these contesting litigants, should be
decided by courts who either know the answer or who can write it if it has not yet
been announced. Texas has a judicial system which will permit adjudication with
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to the state supreme court. In the second case" the court followed the
Delaney decision. The Texas Supreme Court, however, held in United
Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney" that the fact that the Fifth Circuit had
retained jurisdiction made the state proceedings merely advisory and re-
fused to accept jurisdiction. All of the justices, including the dissenters, on
the Texas Supreme Court felt that a Texas declaratory judgment would
make the case res judicata and thereby sounded the death-knell to the exer-
cise of the abstention doctrine by federal courts in Texas when the state
law is obscure or nonexistent.
After the Texas Supreme Court refused to take jurisdiction in the dec-
laratory judgment suit, the Fifth Circuit, again sitting en banc, in Paul
Revere Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank"5 reversed and remanded the case,
distinguishing the insurance clause from that involved in the Warren case
although the two seemed similar. The dissent criticized "the lame and
specious distinctions by which the majorityopinion undertakes to sweep
aside the decisions of these two [federal district] judges and the controlling
case from the Texas Supreme Court" and considered the distinction as
"unwarranted, illogical and insupportable in Texas law."7 Judge Gewin
felt that it was the duty of the court under the Erie doctrine to take the
stand with the Texas judges on what constitutes Texas law whether or not
it liked it8 and stated that the majority "in its revolt against the law of
Texas""1 caused a grave injustice. 2
All these cases have been noted in great detail elsewhere with regard
to the substantive law involved."3 We have considered here only the result
which the supreme court decision will have on the application of the ab-
stention doctrine in similar situations. All of these cases have received na-
tion-wide attention."
IV. CONCLUSION
Since the question of when a nonresident or foreign corporation is
dispatch and speed. And.its excellent Judges and Courts have a full arsenal of pro-
cedural devices which will enable the parties to have a prompt and completely
sufficient determination.
Id. at 489.
"'St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Price, 329 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1964).
76 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965), 20 Sw. L.J. 402 (1966) and 44 TEXAS L. Rrv. 1394 (1966).
See Davis, Insurance, in this Survey issue.
" The problem that a declaratory judgment by the state court might have the effect of res
judicata or collateral estoppel had been raised before. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 429 (1963) (Douglas, J. concurring).
78359 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1966), 20 Sw. L.J. 878, 4 HOUSTON L. REv. 301.
7
" Id. at 645.
80 Ibid.
" Id. at 649.
sa Id. at 649. Judge Gewin expressed the hope that the defeated parties would seek "the elusive
and expensive Writ of Certiorari." Ibid.
" See Davis, Insurance, in this Survey issue.
84 See note 76 supra.
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"doing business" in the forum state is one of both law and fact, the
steady stream of cases dealing with the problem of jurisdiction over the
person continues unabated. Apart from statutory construction problems of
the various long-arm statutes almost every case in this field poses the ques-
tion of what constitutes minimum contacts, the constitutional limits of
their application. The Fifth Circuit and federal district courts in Texas, in
situations where jurisdiction is based on a single contract or tort have em-
phasized as a criterion that the defendant must have "purposefully" sought
out the business in Texas."' In the field of full faith and credit to sister-
state judgments obtained by service of process under long-arm statutes no
new problems were encountered. On the contrary, it seems that none of
the cases decided in the last term seem to have warranted an appeal since
the arguments of the appellants appear to have little merit."
Although the Texas Supreme Court has correctly applied the jurisdic-
tional bases for foreign alimony decrees,' some courts of appeals still seem
to be unconscious of the due process requirements imposed by the United
States Supreme Court upon the exercise of custody jurisdiction over non-
resident parents.' The number of cases dealing with full faith and credit
to foreign support decrees should be considerably reduced through the ap-
plication of the new system of registration for foreign support orders in-
troduced by the 1965 Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act."'
The two court of civil appeals decisions dealing with foreign judgments
affecting Texas land decided during the last term indicate complete un-
familiarity with the most elementary principles of the jurisdictional basis
for such judgments although the Texas Supreme Court in McElreath v.
McElreath had restated them clearlk several years ago.As to choice-of-law, no important cases showing a new trend were
decided. In the Castilleja case," concerned with the claim of the luckless
co-owner of a lucky ticket in the Mexican National Lottery, the court of
civil appeals solved the case by characterizing the action as one by the
owner of the funds against a constructive trustee. This seems to be a much
more satisfactory approach than that of many other courts in characteriz-
ing the action as one based on an illegal contract which must be declared
invalid as being against the public policy of the forum.
"
5Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d "847, 853 (5th Cir. 1966),
quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1957). See also Hearne v. Dow Badische Chem.
Co., 224 F. Supp. 90, 99 (S.D. Tex. 1963), quoting the same language.
"See text accompanying notes 1-14 supra.8 7Rumpf v. Rumpf, 150 Tex. 475, 242 S.W.2d 416 (1951) (full faith and credit to foreign
alimony decree). There seems to be no Texas Supreme Court case- dealing with full faith and credit
since May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) was decided.
as See text accompanying notes 30-37 ssupra.
'
9 Tx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2328-4, § 36 (Supp. 1966).
'0162 Tex. 190, 345 S.W.2d 722 (1961), 16 Sw. L.J. 516 (1962).
9' Castilleja v. Camero, 402 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), aff'd, 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 346
(1967).
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The abstention doctrine, applied by federal courts in cases where the
applicable state law is unsettled, has been under attack during the last few
years and seems to have been eliminated for Texas since our supreme court
refused to take jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment case arising from the
Fifth Circuit's decision to stay the federal proceedings and refer the par-
ties to seek a determination of an obscure point of law in the Texas courts."'
The refusal of the Texas Supreme Court to recognize the declaratory judg-
ment action as a "case or controversy" and characterizing it as one for an
advisory opinion closes the door to the exercise of the abstention doctrine
in similar cases in the future and will do away with this "highly cumber-
some, expensive and time consuming" procedure.a The court's indirect
suggestion to adopt the Florida certification practice has thus far not been
heeded by the Texas legislature. The cases on the abstention doctrine have
focused the attention of the law review writers on Texas" and may help to
eliminate this doctrine which has led to many delays, particularly in the
adjudication of diversity of citizenship cases in the federal courts."5
" United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965).
91 ld. at 864.
"See, e.g., Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 850, 855 (1964) referring to "The Fifth Circuit's em-
bellishments," and Comment, 40 TUL. L. REv. 578, 593 (1966).
"See Note, 20 Sw. L.J. 402, 408 (1966) quoting Justice Douglas' dissent in Clay v. Sun Ins.
Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 228 (1960):
Some litigants have long purses. Many, however, can hardly afford one lawsuit,
let alone two. Shuttling the parties between state and federal tribunals is a sure way
of defeating the ends of justice. The pursuit of justice is not an academic exercise.
There are no foundations to finance the resolution of nice state law questions involved
in federal court litigation, The parties are entitled-absent unique and rare situations
-to adjudication of their rights in the tribunals which Congress has empowered
to act.
and mentioning the notorious Spector Motor Serv. Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944) case
which took nine years of litigation in five different courts as a consequence of the federal courts'
abstention in a federal question jurisdiction situation. See WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 171
(1963).
